[snip]: I disagree that 'assertions' that cannot be tested scientifically must be based on zero evidence. There are ways of proving things outside of scientific method. It is, as i have said, just that they lack the clarity of science.
Well, rather, they lack the criterion of falsifiability. Mathematical proofs, legal proofs, biblical/scriptural proofs, and scientific proofs are distinct. Each requires a different degree of demonstration, and each has distinct "performance criteria" (sensu Lewontin 1974). Mathematical proofs are axiomatic, they are true by definition (c.f. Gideon's distinction between "theorem" and "theory"). Legal proofs are based simply on the preponderance of evidence. Scriptural proofs are based on apparent agreement with specific texts. Scientific proofs are evaluated on the basis of explanatory potential and/or predictive power (i.e. performance criteria;" what does the discovery actually do?). Some scientific proofs are also axiomatic, in that violation of them is definitionally impossible. Dunnell (1989, IIRC- I'm away from my references at the moment) used the example of two apparently similar sentances:
1) the sun will come up tomorrow
vs.
2) the sun will come up at dawn
in his attempt to explain this distinction.
Number 1 is a prediction based on replicated experiments, and is therefore probablistic (although the probability of accuracy is very high. It is still a bet, albeit a very good one!)
Number 2 is axiomatic. It is true by definition, since part of our definition of "dawn" is that this is the time the sun comes up.
Legal proofs are, in a certain sense, "democratic," in that they are based on the number of people who are convinced of the veracity of a given scenario (whether this be a 12 person trial jury, a 3 person "grand jury," a 9 member supreme court, or a single judge).
Scriptural proofs are the least likely to have performance criteria. If the bible describes the earth as a circle, then evidence to the contrary must either be regarded as irrelevant (Gotch's approach) or some interpretation of the text that does not conflict with the evidence must be made (Robert's approach).
: By way of evidence against christianity i could sight such matters as (1) inconsistency in the bible, (2) logical arguments against the christian god (for instance Hume's miracle argument), (3) the 12 testaments, and more. It is true that none of these goes to a conclusive proof. I would however consider them persuasive.
numbers inserted by Floyd for clarity in response
Right, but you feel these are persuasive mainly because you are an advocate of one side in the debate. Advocates of the other side would argue that (1)you're misinterpreting the bible, (2) "god" is not explainable by logic, and can defy our attempts to understand him, (3)some appocryphal texts may contradict the cannonical texts, but these are not the "true word," and so forth. This is what I meant by an "advocacy argument," each side can propose reasons why they won't accept the other, but in the absence of some testable criteria, there is no way of resolving the issue other than persistence or volume (who tires of it first, or who shouts the loudest) and the debate is just so much wind in dry grass. However, I admit that it's only a matter of my personal taste that I usually avoid such arguments, as they don't seem to accomplish anything beyond making proponents feel smug about having the one true insight. ;-)
: The problem with this method in dealing with christians is of course that they are not rational agents when dealing with these matters. When confronted with reasoned arguments of god's existence they are prone to slink back into their mantra that it is their 'faith' that guides them.
Exactly.
: Nevertheless such a retreat tends to suggest a weakness in a christian's argument, 'because it is' does not really suffice as an answer in any argument that i have been involved in (well for my part at least).
Agreed, I find it unsatisfying as well, but there seems to be no other outcome of advocacy arguments, at least in my experience.
:(Indeed i wonder if revelation could really be considered as knowledge at all.)
I suppose it could be considered a form of knowledge, in the same way that a dream about a unicorn is really a dream, or a low opinion of Beethoven's 9th is really an opinion, regardless of the unreality of unicorns or the undisputed scientific fact that the 9th is the single greatest piece of music ever. ;-) (now you simply have to realise I'm being facetious here. There is no such thing as a fact of aesthetics; I'm using this to clarify my point about advocacy. How could I ever convince a partisan that the 9th was a better piece of music than the Pogues' If I should Fall From Grace with God? Again, check out Korzybski, I bet you'd like him.)
: At any rate as you have been questioning the veracity of non-scientific knowing, perhaps i should question you as to the basis of scientific knowing. Now, in my green salad days, i seem to recall doing a course that raised such matters as Kuhn, Duhem-Quine and postmodernism, all of which questioned the objectivity of the scientific method. sO, the question being: Is there any truth at all? (Socratic maxims notwithstanding).
OK, fair enough. What Kuhn was actually talking about in SofSR's was that scientists are influenced by their cultural surroundings. Granted. No scientist denies this at all. For example, I find evolutionary theory compelling, in part because I live in the late 20th (and hopefully will also live in the early 21st!) century. Had I lived in the 12th century, I would have considered most of Darwin's work heretical, or at least crazy. After all, species appear to be fixed, at least over the course of a human lifetime (remember, no microscopes in the 12th century, so the rapid evolution of micro-organisms was unknown) and the bible, which I would have had to rely on, can be interpreted as suggesting that species are fixed and unchanging (it doesn't actually say this at all, of course, it simply says that species were created, it says nothing about what happened afterwards. The anti-evolution interpretation is therefore not biblically warranted in the first place, IMHO).
What Kuhn was describing was his recognition that the kinds of questions scientists find interesting, and the kinds of answers they are prepared to accept as valid are, in part, dependent on cultural context. No scientist today is likely to spend much effort researching how to make horse-drawn chariots more efficient, for example, because our culture doesn't use these vehicles. No scientist today is likely to be convinced by any hypothesis involving phlogiston or the all-pervading aether, or attempts to square the circle, although at one time, all of these were considered valuable scientific persuits. This doesn't demonstrate that the scientific method is inherently subjective, simply that scientists who employ it operate within a cultural context, and the subjects to which it is applied are likely to vary as that culture evolves.
As for "post-modernism," I have about as much use for that psuedo-intellectual twaddle as a fish has for a bicycle. Gross and Levitt's Higher Superstition and Sokol and Bircmont's Fashionable Nonsense explain, in stunning detail, why post-modernism is a pile of pretentions ammassed by dolts and fools suffering from delusions of adequacy. (Here is my partisanship showing.) It's all style, no substance, and ultimately less than worthless. OK, so I'm biased; did I ever claim otherwise? ;-)
So, in answer to your query, "Is there any truth at all?" (as an archaeologist, I simply MUST quote Indiana Jones, sorry.) "Archaeology is about _FACTS_. If you're looking for truth, go down the hall to the philosophy department." :-)
Thanks for responding, I'm really loving this!
-Floyd
